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KEEPING THE QUALIFIED PENSION PLAN
QUALIFIED AND RECOGNIZING THE TAX
EFFECTS OF DISQUALIFICATION
STEVEN J. STOGEL* AND KERRY L. ERVIN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Pension plans,' which afford taxpayers special tax considerations,2
may be established for the benefit of eligible employees. The Internal
Revenue Code provides the tax rules governing such plans.' These rules
have recently undergone numerous revisions, including those contained
in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).4
There are two broad classifications of pension plans--qualified and
nonqualified. A qualified plan meets all the requirements, both in form
and operation, of section 401 whereas a nonqualified plan does not.5
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St. Louis, Missouri; and William L. Sollee, Esq., Washington, D.C. Very special thanks is
extended to Frances Beck, St. Louis, Missouri, for her patience, assistance, and coopera-
tion.
1. As used in this article, the phrase "pension plan" or "plan" means a program,
plan, or fund established by a corporation for the benefit of its eligible employees,
including all profit-sharing, money-purchase pension, target benefit, and defined benefit
plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2), (34), (35), and (36) (Supp. V 1975). This article is not
specifically intended to treat unqualified plans, Keogh plans, individual retirement ac-
counts, see I.R.C. § 408, or annuities, see I.R.C. § 403, although many subjects discussed
herein are applicable to these plans.
2. The special tax considerations afforded qualified plans include current employer
deductions, deferral of income for employees, and exemption of the income of the plan's
trust. For a complete discussion of the general tax benefits applicable to qualified plans
and the historical development of these enactments, see 4A J. MERTENS, THE LAw OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25B.01-.64 (1972 ed.).
3. All references in this article are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended, unless noted otherwise. The general, non-tax rules governing pension plans are
codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18,26,
29, 31, & 42 U.S.C.). All references to ERISA made in this article are designated "Act
5. Cf. I.R.C. § 401 (sets forth both affirmative qualification requirements and
characteristics which, unless contained in the plan, will be cause for nonqualification).
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There are approximately 500,0006 qualified pension plans in the
United States, and all must be amended to comply with ERISA.7 As of
November 1976, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had received ap-
proximately 115,000 requests for determination letters.' Upon comple-
tion of this massive qualfication process, 9 attention in the pension plan
area will shift to the actual operation of the plan under ERISA. This
article discusses some of the anticipated problems in this emerging area
of the law, and considers the tax effects that result from a plan's
disqualification.
H. SELF-REVIEW AUDIT PERIOD--RESPONSIBILITY, DUTIES,
AND PRECAUTIONS
A plan's qualified status, regardless of whether the IRS has issued a
determination letter,"0 is measured under the then applicable pension plan
law. A change in a relevant statute, regulation, or revenue ruling can
affect the qualified status of a plan. To ensure conformity with the
applicable law, therefore, a plan should undergo an annual "self-re-
6. Speech by I. Goodman, November 12, 1976, reprinted in PENS. PLAN GUIDE
(CCH) 25,157.
7. See generally Act § 1017. As to nonqualified pension plans subject to ERISA, see
Act § 211. Some plans have been terminated as a result of ERISA's passage. The IRS has
established a "hot line" to dissuade plan terminations. See I.R. 1895 [1977] FED. TAXES
(P-H) 55, 947.
8. See speech by I. Goodman, supra note 6. Upon a taxpayer's request, the I.R.S.,
acting under authority, granted in Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 C.B. 698, updated by I.R.-1683,
[1976] FED. TAXES (P-H) 55,679, and I.R.-1817, [1977] FED. TAXES (P-H) 55,538, and
Announcement 76-130, 1976-43 I.R.B. 28, will issue a determination letter with respect to
the current qualified status of a plan. See generally 4A, J.MERTENS, supra note 2, §
25B.20-.21.
9. An initial ERISA letter of determination, if obtained under the special reliance
procedure (SRP), is valid only until December 31, 1977. Many plans will thus have to be
reamended to comply with regulations and rulings issued since the plan obtained its first
ERISA determination letter. For plans in this circumstance, however, an additional year
for compliance is allowed. I.R. 1675, [1976] FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 55,595. SRP is a unique
procedure, approved by the IRS and Department of Labor to facilitate the processing of
qualification letter requests under ERISA, which enabled employers to adopt a plan that
met specified criteria without concern for subsequently issued guidelines, rulings, or
regulations. The full text of the SRP is set forth in T.I.R. 1416, [1975] FED. TAXES (P-H) 1
55,789, modified by I.R. 1616, [1976] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 1 55,250, republished as, Rev.
Proc. 76-31, 1976-2 C.B. 649. As of this date, the SRP is only applicable to plans that
submitted qualification requests on or before December 31, 1976. Given the number of
extensions to the remedial amendment period, however, see note 25 infra, the SRP is of
little continuing importance.
10. A plan can be qualified by meeting the requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a). There is no
requirement that a determination letter be obtained.
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view." With the advent of ERISA and its continuing reformulation, this
self-review should focus on both the form and the operation of the
plan.II An annual self-review 2 is further suggested because it coincides
with a basic principle of pension plan law; specifically, that a plan's
qualified status will be determined on a year-to-year basis.1 3
A. Form of the Plan
If the plan's form must be amended to comply with the current law,
those changes, whether substantial or minor, must be made in a timely
fashion. The plan amendment guidelines are set forth in section 401(b)
and its regulations. 14
Prior to ERISA, a plan could be amended at any time during the plan
year for that year. With respect to certain items, pre-ERISA section
401(b) also provided that the plan could be amended within seventy-five
days after the close of the initial plan year retroactively for that year.
15
II. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (1956). The IRS's current qualification letters contain
the following statement: "Continued qualification of the Plan will depend on its effect in
operation under its present form . . . .The status of the Plan in operation will be
reviewed periodically." Form 794.
12. An annual review should suffice for most plans; approximately 80% have less
than 10 participants, and the number of transactions and events during a year can be
quickly ascertained, summarized, and analyzed. Of course, the larger the plan, the more
time it will take to review it properly.
13. See Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 1966); Treas. Reg. §
1.401 (c) (1956); Rev. Rul. 71-153, 1971-1 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 63-10, 1963-1 C.B. 90.
14. Technically, as discussed in notes 20-31 infra and accompanying text, I.R.C. §
401(b) applies only to "disqualifying provisions." With regard to non-disqualifying provi-
sions, the generally accepted rule is that the plan amendment must be executed and made
effective within the plan year to which the amendment is to apply. In Aero Rental v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 331 (1975), however, the Tax Court held that pre-ERISA I.R.C. §
401(b) was a "safe harbor" provision and allowed retroactive form amendments to a plan
to be made at a time beyond that afforded by the statute. 64 T.C. at 341. Nevertheless,
because Aero Rental applied only to an initial qualification request, its application to all
form amendments is uncertain. But see Mendenhall Corp. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. -,
[1977] TAX. CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,556, discussed at notes 34-35 infra and accompany-
ing text.
15. Prior to ERISA, I.R.C. § 401(b) read as follows:
CERTAIN RETROACTIVE CHANGES IN PLAN. A stock bonus, pension, profit-
sharing or annuity plan shall be considered as satisfying the requirements of
paragraphs (3), (4), (5) and (6) of subsection (a) for the period beginning with the
date on which it was put into effect and ending on the 15th day of the third month
following the close of the taxable year of the employer in which the plan was put
in effect, if all provisions of the plans which are necessary to satisfy such
requirements are in effect by the end of such period and have been made effective
for all purposes with respect to the whole of such period.
The ability to use this section for certain retroactive changes was limited to initial
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ERISA had a significant impact on section 401(b) because it extended the
time during which amendments to a plan's form may be made for a given
plan year.' 6 Section 401(b) now provides:
CERTAIN RETROACTIVE CHANGES IN PLAN-A stock bonus, pen-
sion, profit-sharing, or annuity plan shall be considered as satisfying
the requirements of subsection (a) for the period beginning with the
date on which it was put into effect, or for the period beginning with
the earlier of the date on which there was adopted or put into effect
any amendment which caused the plan to fail to satisfy such require-
ments, and ending with the time prescribed by law for filing the
return of the employer for his taxable year in which such plan or
amendment was adopted (including extensions thereof) or such later
time as the Secretary may designate, if all provisions of the plan
which are necessary to satisfy such requirements are in effect by the
end of such period and have been made effective for all purposes
for the whole of such period.
The Secretary of the Treasury has issued extensive regulations which
amplify this statute. It is important to note that the regulations are limited
to the amendment of "disqualifying provisions." 17 This refers to "[a]
provision of a new plan, the absence of a provision from a new plan, or
an amendment to an existing plan, which causes such plan to fail to
satisfy" the Code's qualification requirements as of the date such plan or
amendment is first made effective;' 8 or, a provision which disqualifies
the plan because of a change in the qualification requirements effected by
ERISA. 19 Although subject to certain limitations,2" current section
qualifications and to subparagraphs (3)-(6), inclusive, of I.R.C. § 401(a) which then dealt
with coverage, discrimination-in-operation, integration, and the four quarters test, respec-
tively. Cf. Aero Rental v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 331 (1975) (taxpayer successfully argues
that I.R.C. § 401(b) permits retroactive plan form amendments), discussed in notes 32-33
infra and accompanying text.
16. Under ERISA each plan is required to specify a definite plan year. See Act §
3(39). In most cases, the fiscal period of a plan will coincide with the fiscal year of the
sponsoring corporate employer(s). See Rev. Proc. 1977-44, -I.R.B.-.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-l(b) (1976).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-l(b) (1) (1976).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-l(b) (2) (1976). For this purpose, the definition of disqual-
ifying provision includes the absence from a plan of a provision required by any changes
effected by ERISA if the plan was in effect on the date such change became effective with
respect to such plan.
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-l(a) (1976), provides two limitations on the availability of
retroactive plan amendments. The first general rule provides, in its entirety:
Under some facts and circumstances, it may not be possible to amend a plan
retroactively so that all provisions of the plan which are necessary to satisfy the
[Vol. 1977:565
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401(b) and its regulations generally provide greater latitude for retroac-
tive amendments to the form of a plan than was permitted under pre-
ERISA law.
Section 401(b) specifies that a disqualifying provision may be correct-
ed retroactively on or before the last day in the "remedial amendment
period.' '21 In fact, all such provisions are remedied effective as of the
date the amendments should have been made.22 The remedial amendment
period begins (i) in the case of a new plan, on the date the plan is put into
effect; (ii) in the case of an amendment to an existing plan, on the date
the plan amendment is adopted or put into effect, whichever is earlier; or
(iii) in the case of an amendment to an existing plan initiated because of
ERISA, on the date ERISA became effective with respect to that plan.23
The regulation specifies when the remedial amendment period ends.24
In the case of a plan maintained by one employer, the remedial amend-
ment period ends with the latest of (a) the time prescribed by law,
including extensions thereof, for the filing of the income tax return of the
employer for the employer's taxable year in which falls the latest of (i)
the date the remedial amendment period begins, or (ii) the date the
amendment is adopted, or (iii) the date the amendment is made effective,
or (b) the last day of the plan year within which falls the latest of (i) the
date the remedial amendment period begins, or (ii) the date the amend-
ment is adopted, or (iii) the date the amendment is made effective.'5 The
requirements of section 401(a) are in fact made effective for the whole remedial
amendment period. If it is not possible, the requirements of this section will not
be satisfied even if the employer adopts a retroactive plan amendment which, in
form, appears to satisfy such requirements. (emphasis added)
The second caveat is as follows: "Section 401(b) does not permit a plan to be made
retroactively effective, for qualification purposes, for a taxable year prior to the taxable
year of the employer in which the Plan was adopted by such employer." The first rule
technically prohibits the use of I.R.C. § 401(b) plan amendments to correct operational
defects. See Forsyth Emergency Services, P.A. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. -, [1977] TAX
CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,627; Ludden v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. -, [1977] TAX CT. REP.
(CCH) Dec. 34,610 n.7. The second caveat prohibits the use of I.R.C. § 401(b) to
implement a plan retroactively for a year prior to that in which it has been adopted.
21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-l(c) (1976).
22. ERISA had many effective dates. For example, most of ERISA's substantive
pension plan provisions, contained in Titles I and II of the Act, became effective with
respect to plans in existence on January 1, 1974, as of the first day of the first plan year
commencing after December 31, 1975. See Act §§ 211(b), 1017(b).
23. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-l(c)(1) (1976).
24. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-l(c)(2) (1976).
25. This general deadline for the end of the remedial amendment period was also
extended by Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-l(c)(2)(iv) (1976) to December 31, 1976. On September
13, 1977, the final date was again extended, to December 31, 1977. I.R. 1883, [1977] FED.
TAXES (P-H) 55,875.
Number 41
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plan may seek to extend the remedial amendment period by making a
timely request for a determination letter.2 6 In this circumstance, the
remedial amendment period is generally extended until ninety-one days
after the IRS makes its final determination, or until the plan timely files a
petition with the United States Tax Court for a declaratory judgment.27 In
addition, the Secretary has granted the Commissioner extensive discre-
tionary authority to extend the remedial amendment period.28
Still another consideration arises when the IRS issues a revenue ruling
that affects a plan. Although a revenue ruling is an official, published
IRS interpretation of a point of law, it does not have the effect of law.29
Nevertheless, under pre-ERISA law30 and ERISA practice, 31 the IRS
26. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-l(d)(3) (1976).
27. Id.
28. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-I(e) (1976). Additional information concerning the
application of the discretionary extension provisions as outlined by the Commissioner can
be found in a publication to regional commissioners, republished in PENS. PLAN GUIDE
(CCH) 23,205.
29. See 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 2, .§ 49.87(b).
30. In Rev. Proc. 72-6, 1972-1 C.B. 710, § 5.04, the IRS provided that the publication
of a revenue ruling will not adversely affect the qualification of an individually designed
plan if: (1) the plan was the subject of a favorable determination letter and the request for
the letter contained no misstatement or omission of material facts, (2) the facts subse-
quently developed are not materially different from the facts on which the determination
letter was based, (3) there has been no change in the applicable law, and (4) the employer
that established the plan acted in good faith in reliance on the determination letter. The
revenue procedure then states that "all such plans must be amended to comply with the
published Revenue Ruling for subsequent years" and that "[t]he conforming amendment
must be adopted before the end of the first taxable year that begins after the Revenue
Ruling is published and must be effective, for all purposes, not later than the first day of
the taxable year beginning after the Revenue Ruling is published." The same revenue
procedure, §5.05, provides similar rules for master or prototype plans. If these four tests
are not met, the revenue ruling is effective immediately. Therefore, a plan should prompt-
ly be brought into compliance with a revenue ruling.
It should be noted that the revenue procedure refers to taxable year, which presumably
refers to that of the employer, not of the plan, and which may present a timing problem if
the employer(s) are on a fiscal year basis different from that of the plan. Additionally,
because of the time such a ruling must be made effective-the first day of the next
"taxable year"-a plan may actually have more time to comply with a newly issued
revenue ruling than with other "disqualifying provisions" under Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-I
(1976). Because of the special nature of revenue rulings, however, this distinction makes
sense. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
A recent declaration by the Tax Court noted that "a taxpayer must keep informed about
subsequent published rulings of the IRS which may affect his private (determination)
ruling." Wisconsin Nipple Fabricating Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 490,497-98 (1976).
31. The following language is in IRS Form 794 (revised November 1976), which is
attached to each ERISA qualification letter: "A Revenue Ruling can also adversely affect
a favorable determination letter but only for years after the Ruling is issued. However, all
[Vol. 1977:565
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requires that a plan be amended to comply with an applicable revenue
ruling as of the first day of the plan year commencing after the ruling was
issued.
If changes in the law create the need to amend the form of a plan, and
the required amendment is not made within the statutorily prescribed
time, some courts have, in certain other limited circumstances, permitted
otherwise untimely form amendments. In Aero Rental v. Commission-
er,32 the Tax Court permitted qualifying form amendments to be made
well after the period allowed by statute and regulation. The retroactive
form amendments did not affect the actual operation of the plan in issue.
Moreover, the plan sought a determination letter within a relatively short
time.33 The importance of a prompt request for a determination letter was
vividly apparent in Mendenhall Corp. v. Commissioner.'4 The Tax
Court, in Mendenhall, held that form defects resulting from the omission
of plan language that was required for life insurance limitations, non-
reversion of corpus, full vesting on termination, and annual valuations,
could not be retroactively cured under the Aero Rental doctrine because
the taxpayer delayed more than three years before requesting a determi-
nation letter. It should be noted, however, that these cases involved
initial qualification requests by pre-ERISA plans. It is not yet known
whether the courts will permit retroactive qualifying form amendments to
cure initial or subsequent qualification form defects that have not affected
the operation of the plan.35
B. Operation of the Plan
The second, and perhaps more critical aspect of the self-review proc-
ess, involves a close scrutiny of the manner in which the plan is actually
operated. The initial consideration is whether the plan is operated in
accordance with its actual terms. If the plan's form complies with the
plans must be amended to comply with relevant Rulings. The amendment must be
effective not later than the first day of the first taxable year after the Ruling is published."
Form 794.
32. 64 T.C. 331 (1975).
33. In Community Servs., Inc. v. United States, 422 F.2d 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1970), the plan
requested a determination letter within two years after the amendment was adopted, and
the court permitted the retroactive cure. Nevertheless, after the ERISA amendment to §
401(b), and Aero Rental, this two year period may not provide adequate protection. The
Tax Court, in Aero Rental, was critical of the plan's adoption in the last month of the year
and the plan's six month delay in requesting IRS approval. Otherwise, Community
Services reaches the same result, and reflects Aero Rental's permissive philosophy.
34. 68 T.C. -, [1977] TAx CT. REP. (CCII) Dec. 34,556.
35. Aero should not be broadly read to permit retroactive operational cures.
Number 4]
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qualification requirements, the operation of that plan in accordance with
its terms will avoid such patent operational problems as timely enroll-
ment of participants, and the mechanical application of a benefit formula
or vesting schedule.3 6
(i) Minor Non-Discriminatory Variations
A question that arises in this context is whether minor, non-dis-
criminatory, operational, or administrative variations 37 from the actual
terms of a plan will adversely affect the plan's qualified status. By
definition, these variations do not relate to the qualification requirements
contained in section 401(a), and thus a negative, although qualified,
response is possible. In Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner,38 the Ninth
Circuit held that a plan's failure to pay contributions in cash,39 keep
records for two years, or pay participants their due benefits, did not
disqualify the plan. The court held that the appropriate test was whether
plan benefits were prejudiced or the employer's indirect benefits were
increased. 4° Thus, although the dollar amount may be large, where the
shift in advantage to employer or employee is not substantial and the
variation is de minimis, substance rather than form should be the guide. 41
The court, however, urged caution:
At this point a caveat should be issued. This court has not reached
the point herein of what should be held if the commissioner after
discovering variations in form though not of substance should de-
mand literal compliance in futuro with the approved plan and should
36. See, e.g., Myron v. United States, 550 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1977); Ludden v.
Commissioner, 68 T.C. -, [1977] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,610. See also I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(1).
37. This article separates "minor" and "major" operational errors. In practice,
however, these distinctions are not always clear cut, although the critical definitional
distinction is whether discrimination in operation, see I.R.C. § 401(a)(4), results from the
particular variation or error. Generally, in practice, disqualification will not result from
minor, nondiscriminatory errors. A "minor" variation will not relate to the qualification
requirements of I.R.C. § 401.
38. 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958).
39. The holding in Time Oil that corporate promissory notes can constitute deductible
payments to qualified plans would probably be reversed by the Supreme Court. See
Williams v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977).
40. 258 F.2d at 238. With respect to a determination of whether a plan is operated for
the exclusive benefit of the eligible employees (I.R.C. § 401(a)(2)), Treas. Reg. § 1.401-
l(b)(3) (1956) specifically provides that "[a]ll of the surrounding and attendant circum-
stances and details of the plan" can be considered, and thus supports the position
advanced in Time Oil. See also notes 81-86 infra and accompanying text.
41. 258 F.2d at 238.
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fail to get it. A court might grant him the prerogative of disallowing
the deductions after such a warning. He is to be commended for
insisting that taxpayers conform to the plan they established with
his approval, but the interest of employees is also to be considered.
Here while hard justice might befit Time Oil Company's officers,
yet prospective consequences of injury to the employees from the
commissioner's position here are quite possible as contrasted with
the lack of injury shown to them in the shortcomings of the errant
taxpayer.
42
During the self-review process, therefore, uncovered "minor" errors
should be promptly corrected, to avoid the Commissioner's "warn-
ings." 43 This approach is reinforced by recognizing that the ultimate
impact of a "minor" variation may be unknown at the time it occurs. In a
later audit, an examining IRS agent may assert that the outcome of such
variations were "foreseeable" and had become "major," or discrimina-
tory, and thus necessitated the plan's disqualfication.
(ii) Bookkeeping-Administrative Errors
During a plan's administration, mathematical, bookkeeping, or ad-
ministrative errors can, and will be, made which may result in discrimi-
nation-in-operation or some other major operational problem. For exam-
ple, a participant's eligibility, 44 vesting,45 benefits, 46 or payments47 could
42. 258 F.2d at 239.
43. The Time Oil court's warning anticipated two recent Tax Court cases, see notes
48-52 infra and accompanying text, although the Tax Court's position is much stricter than
the Time Oil philosophy. More importantly, a dangerous problem can arise if the terms of
a plan are ambiguous or silent as to a particular operational problem, event, or fact. The
solution is to amend the plan promptly (or seek an appropriate administrative determina-
tion) to clarify, address, or cure the specific situation. If the problem is not so addressed,
problems can arise on audit.
44. A plan may have an eligibility period of six months, but may be operated on a
year's eligibility basis. A possible ERISA problem may be the misapplication of the dual
or multiple entry date requirements. Pittman Constr. Co. v. United States, 436 F.Supp.
1215 (E.D. La. 1977).
45. Assume that a pre-ERISA plan provided for vesting based upon "years of partici-
pation" in the plan, and that the plan is amended to provide for vesting based on "years of
service" to comply with ERISA. It is possible that the plan may nevertheless be adminis-
tered on a "participation" basis. Another likely example of the misapplication of a plan's
vesting schedule is crediting some, but not all, participants who terminated employment
during a plan year and had 1000 or more hours of service with a year of service. A third
example is the failure to apply properly the hour-of-service standard.
46. Assume that a defined benefit plan provided a unit benefit formula of 1/2 of 1% of
compensation for each year of service prior to the adoption of the plan and 1% per year
commencing with the adoption of the plan, and that the plan was adopted in 1960. The
Number 4]
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all be affected by incorrect or inaccurate administration. Unfortunately,
these errors, which by definition occur inadvertently, are prevalent and
frequently repetitive; this serves to compound a plan's potential for
serious, discriminatory operational defects. They are most common in
smaller plans, which cannot afford the constant attention of competent,
professional administrators.
A recent trilogy of Tax Court cases is particularly relevant to the
resolution of the "bookkeeping" error issue. The taxpayer in Quality
Brands, Inc. v. Commissioner,4s argued that the alleged discrimination-
in-operation was the result of "bookkeeping mistakes" in the allocation
of forfeitures, which could be corrected by retroactive mathematical
adjustments without prejudice to any party. The Tax Court did not reach
the merits of the taxpayer's argument because it held that the discrimina-
tion did not result from an "error." The court concluded that the
trustee's interpretation of the formula for allocating forfeitures resulted in
the plan's being discriminatory-in-operation.4 9
The Tax Court, in an opinion by Judge Scott, addressed this issue
again in Ludden v. Commissioner.5" In this case, the corporation made
contributions to its retirement plans for two employees, who were both
within the prohibited group, 51 but inadvertently omitted a contribution for
benefit should be easy to compute. An employee, who started in 1950 and who was to
retire at his normal retirement date in 1980, would be entitled to a plan benefit of 25% of
compensation (10 years times 1/2 of 1% plus 20 years times 1%). However, if the plan
administrator does not limit the past service credit benefit to years of service prior to 1960,
a gross distortion occurs. The plan benefit for the above hypothetical employee in 1975
would be only 17 1/2%, calculated as follows: 25 years times 1/2 of 1% plus 5 years times
1%. By the time this employee reached his normal retirement date in 1980 his benefit
would be 15% of compensation. Another example is easily conceptualized in a defined
contribution plan in which the trust's earnings (or losses) are incorrectly allocated to the
participant's separate account.
47. As a result of an actuarial or accounting error, a plan participant may receive an
underpayment or an overpayment from a plan. See, e.g., Bailey v. Brick Layers Tenders
Local 59, 80 Misc. 2d 583, 363 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975); First Nat'l City Bank v.
McManus, 29 N.C. App. 65, 223 S.E.2d 554 (1976); Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
85 Wash. 2d 78, 530 P.2d 298 (1975); Rev. Rul. 69-190, 1969-1 C.B. 131.
48. 67 T.C. 167 (1976).
49. Id. at 174. An important point in the court's analysis of the trustee's intent was
that the sponsor of the plan in issue initially sought a qualification letter, but did not
complete the submission process when the IRS raised questions concerning the plan and
the allocation formula. This subsequently became the source of the discrimination-in-
operation. Id. at 169, 175.
50. 68 T.C. -, [1977] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,610.
51. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4). The plan may not discriminate in favor of the "prohibited
group" which includes officers, shareholders, and highly compensated employees.
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the other eligible employee, who was not within the prohibited group.
When an IRS audit discovered this omission, the taxpayer "offered" to
reallocate past contributions among all three employees as if the contri-
butions had been made correctly. This "offer" was made on the condi-
tion that the IRS would not disqualify the plans. The taxpayers further
argued that failure to accept this "offer" would constitute an abuse of
discretion by the Commissioner. The Tax Court noted the absence of a
Code provision governing the retroactive correction of administrative
errors; it therefore found no statutory guidelines to aid it in assessing
whether the Commissioner would, in fact, abuse his discretion by a
refusal to qualify a plan that retroactively corrected its "bookkeeping
errors."
The Tax Court, as in Quality Brands, then reserved judgment "on the
question whether and under what circumstances respondent would be
justified in refusing to confer qualified status on a plan when an inadver-
tent error in administration such as the one involved in this case, had
been in fact voluntarily rectified by those charged with operating the
Plan."52 The Court concluded that failure to include the eligible employ-
ee was clearly discriminatory, and because the plan did not voluntarily
correct the error, it was disqualified under section 401(a).
The most recent Tax Court case in this area, a decision by Judge
Dawson, is Forsyth Emergency Services, P.A. v. Commissioner.53 The
issue was whether the improper operation of a plan's eligibility test can
be retroactively, cured by additional admissions and contributions. In
Forsyth, certain employees were inadvertently omitted from the corpora-
tion's plan because of an error in the interpretation of the plan's participa-
tion entry date. After an IRS audit and issuance of an adverse determina-
tion letter, the taxpayer made additional contributions (with interest) to
rectify the omission. Concluding that the plan in operation was not
technically qualified because of a failure to satisfy the coverage tests, the
court held that:
Unfortunately, we find no support for retroactive cure in this case
in the code, regulations, or case law.
. . . There is no allowance in. . . [Code §] 402(a) for an excuse
to be offered to neutralize the effect of an objectionable operation,
52. 68 T.C. at-, [1977] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,610. This holding in Ludden, as
well as the development of a "bookkeeping-error" doctrine, draw support from Myron v.
United States, 550 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1977).
53. 68 T.C. -, [1977] TAX. CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,627.
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irrespective of whether the cause resulted from an honest mistake,
inadvertence, erroneous advice of counsel, or intentional misdirec-
tion.54
Judge Dawson, writing for the court, also discussed the case law that
allegedly endorsed the allowance of retroactive bookkeeping error cures.
Aero Rental was inapplicable because it concerned only temporary form
defects, none of which affected the operation of a plan or caused dis-
crimination-in-operation. Ray Cleaners, Inc. v. Commissioner5 5 was
also inapplicable because the administrative error which excluded three
eligible employees did not cause the discrimination-in-operation that
occured in Forsyth. In addition, Judge Dawson rejected the "bookkeep-
ing error" concept that was intimated, but reserved, in Ludden and
Quality Brands.
The impact of Quality Brands, Ludden, and Forsyth is uncertain.
Judge Scott's opinion in Ludden is considerably less critical of the
"bookkeeping error" concept than Judge Dawson's language in Forsyth.
Moreover, it is uncertain what interpretation other courts will give these
cases. It is safe only to conclude that the final position on this issue by the
Tax Court and other competent courts is unclear.
Both Ludden and Forsyth involved the misapplication of coverage
requirements which resulted in clear discrimination-in-operation. It is
unknown whether the Tax Court would allow the retroactive cure of
bookkeeping errors that do not affect coverage. If the Tax Court attempts
to delineate on a case by case basis those operational errors that can be
retroactively cured, considerable litigation, reflecting the multitude of
possible bookkeeping errors, will result. The Tax Court has not con-
sidered the case of a bookkeeping error that does not result in discrimina-
tion-in-operation. Unfortunately, the Forsyth decision may impede both
acceptance and development of a broader doctrine that would permit
retroactive cure of all bookkeeping errors regardless of whether tempo-
rary discrimination-in-operation has resulted. The rationale for such a
doctrine is that where only inadvertent, human errors have occurred, the
plan and all its participants are made "whole" without disqualification.
The Code, moreover, does not prevent the recognition of this doctrine
which, as current practice indicates, fosters the liberal purposes of
pension plan law.
54. Id. at -, [1977] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,627.
55. 27 T.C.M. (CCII) 23 (1968).
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If a bookkeeping error is discovered during self-review of a plan, prior
to an IRS audit, the plan should take immediate steps to remedy the
situation. Quality Brands, Ludden, and Forsyth were all instances in
which the bookkeeping error was discovered as a result of an IRS audit.
This fact not only emphasizes the importance of self-review, but also
leaves open the possibility, although unlikely, of a different result when a
plan finds and cures its own error.
The practical problem in the self-review process is how to correct such
bookkeeping errors when and if they are discovered. Suppose, for
example, that a defined contribution profit sharing plan's eligibility test is
grossly misapplied for several years. The result may be that a number of
employees will fail to enter the plan in a timely fashion and will not
receive the correct contribution and trust income allocations. There are
two basic options open to a plan upon discovery of such an error. First, it
may ignore the past errors, operate the plan correctly in the future, and
hope the statute of limitations runs before an IRS audit of the plan
uncovers the error.56 Besides disqualification of the plan if the error is
discovered,57 this action also raises the possibility of litigation by partici-
pants, 58 or criminal sanctions. 59
The second, more viable option is retroactively, voluntarily, and
promptly to cure these "bookkeeping errors," and prospectively to
operate the plan correctly. The issue then is whether to disclose to the
government the error and corrective action taken. Although many factors
56. The statute of limitations for plans that have filed the required informational
returns is three years. See I.R.M.-Audit 45(10) 5-2 § 613.6(1). The returns required prior to
ERISA were Forms 990-P and 990-T. See I.R.M.-Audit 45(10) 5-2 § 210(3). The primary
ERISA returns are Forms 5500 and 990-T. See generally Zid, Meeting the Reporting and
Disclosure Requirements, Handling the Accountant's Problems in his Auditing of the Plan,
1976 N.Y.U. 34th INST. FED. TAX. 1149.
57. See, e.g., Forsyth Emergency Servs., P.A. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. -, [1977]
TAx CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,627. If a judicial doctrine that allows retroactive cure of
bookkeeping errors develops, the question of burden of proof will undoubtedly arise.
Absent a specific rule, the general rule of civil tax litigation under which the taxpayer
(here the plan or employer) bears the burden of proof will prevail. See Tax Court Rule 142,
60 T.C. 1133-34 (1973). This result is reasonable because the taxpayer has knowledge of
the surrounding events and circumstances.
58. See Act § 502.
59. Depending on the specific errors involved, a bookkeeping error may place the
plan administrator in a difficult position with respect to the correctness of informational
returns filed and to be filed, and may thereby subject him to various criminal sanctions.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970); I.R.C. § 7203; Act § 510.
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influence this decision, it is presently recommended 6° that a plan make
such a disclosure, at least to the extent that such action affects a pending
determination letter request or the plan's informational returns that were
previously filed with the various governmental agencies. 61
(iii) Major Operational Considerations
Although a plan is operated according to its terms and is administered
without bookkeeping errors, there are other operational problems which
may result in its disqualification. Several requirements in section 401
address the operational status of a plan, including the exclusive benefit
rule62 and the nondiscrimination mandate. 63 Because these requirements
are incapable of precise definition, 64 conflicting interpretations may be
60. This action is recommended because the IRS's present position is to cooperate
fully with plans in this situation. See Simmons, Dangers in the Disqualification of Pension
Plans, 1976 N.Y.U. 34th INsT. FED. TAX. 507. Note, however, that if the principle in
Forsyth becomes the rule, the general approach of cooperation and disclosure will be
significantly, and adversely, affected.
61. See note 59 supra.
62. See I.R.C. § 401(a) & 401(a)(2). Feroleto Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. -,
[1977] TAx CT. REP. (CCII) Dec. 34,610.
63. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) which provides in pertinent part:
A Trust. . . forming part of a. . . plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit
of his employees . . . shall constitute a qualified trust under this section-(4) if
the contributions or benefits provided under the plan do not discriminate in favor
of employees who are-(A) officers, (B) shareholders, or (C) highly compen-
sated.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 225.
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a)(2)(iii), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 232.
For cases interpreting section 401 requirements, see the following:
Allocation: Auner v. United States, 440 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1971); Charles E. Smith &
Sons, Co., v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953
(1951); Gold Seal Products Co. v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 82,436 (N.D. Ala.
1973); Quality Brands, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 167 (1976); Robertson v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C. 727 (1974).
Coverage: Myron v. United States, 550 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1977); Container Service Co.
v. United States, 478 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1973); George Loevsky v. Commissioner, 471 F.2d
1178 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973); Cornell-Young Co. v. United States, 469
F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1972); Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d
390 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g 48 T.C. 75 (1967); John Duguid & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 278
F. Supp. 101 (N.D.N.Y. 1967); Wisconsin Nipple Fabricating Corp. v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 490 (1976), appeal docketed, No. 77-1792 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 1977); Babst Servs., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 131 (1976); Packard v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 621 (1975); Lib-
erty Mach. Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 621 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 518 F.2d
554 (8th Cir. 1975); Bernard McManamy, Contractors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1057
(1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 359 (1971); Loper Sheet Metal, Inc., 53 T.C. 385 (1969);
Ed & Jim Fleitz, Inc., 50 T.C. 384 (1968); Peter F. Mitchell Corp., 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1030
(1968), supplemented by, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 425 (1969); Ray Cleaners, Inc., 27 T.C.M.
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asserted by a plan and an IRS agent. The problems in this area are
magnified in smaller plans where operational discrimination in favor of
the prohibited group is often extremely clear.
Once a potential discrimination-in-operation problem is uncovered by
the plan in the self-review process, several alternatives are available. Of
course, the problem may simply be ignored. The plan may, on the other
hand, request an informal, non-binding determination by the local IRS
office as to whether the operational problem exists and how it may be
remedied. Although the plan is not entitled to receive or rely on such a
discussion or opinion,65 it may provide a number of viable alternatives.
Finally, and regardless of whether the plan pursues an advisory opinion,
the plan may play it "safe" and take action to eliminate the problem.
III. AUDIT PROCESS
An audit of a plan can arise indirectly from an audit of the employer's
income or excise tax returns, or directly from an audit of the plan's
returns.66 At the present time, the IRS Audit Manual suggests that
various subjects be considered during an examination of a plan or plan's
trust.6 7 During an audit, an IRS agent may discover defects in the form or
Definition of Employee: Burnetta v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 387 (1977); Jim's Window
Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 563 (1974).
Definition of Supervisor: Marjorie F. Birnie, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 867 (1953).
Discrimination: Quality Brands, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 167 (1976); Betty C.
Stockvis 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 74 (1951), Volckening, Inc. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 723
(1949).
Integration: Simmons v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,339 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
Loans, Notes, Trusts: Central Motor Co. v. United States, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,523
(D.N.M. 1976); Advance Constr. Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Lansing v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421 (1976); Trebotich v. Commissioner, 57
T.C. 326 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1974).
Past Service: Sherman Constr. Corp. v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Va.
1973).
Vesting: United States v. Hall, 398 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1968).
65. See I.R.M.-Audit 45(10) 2.7. The IRS's present practice does not require identifi-
cation of the specific plan, and thus allows the plan (or its representatives) the safety of
anonymity in pursuing such requests. See also 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 2, § 49.94.
66. See I.R.M. (CCH) 45(10) 1.1; I.R.M. (CCH) 45G-279.
67. See I.R.M.-Audit 45(10) 5 § 210. The manual contains a detailed description of the
items that may be audited, including, but not limited to, (i) operational features such as
coverage, vesting, compensation, not following the plan, termination, etc., (ii) contribu-
tion deductions, timely payments, property form, I.R.C. § 404 limitations; (iii) actuarial
considerations, (iv) special problems of profit sharing plans, (v) executive benefit provi-
sions, and (vi) guidelines for revocations. Additional ERISA items that may also be
audited include the break-in-service rules, vesting standards, hours of service rules, and
I.R.C. § 415 limitations.
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operation of the plan. The discovery of a problem in form, bookkeeping-
administration, or operation during an audit does not automatically cause
the plan to be disqualified; there is some authority, in each instance, to
prevent the plan's disqualification. 68
A. Form Defects
One possible cure for defects in a plan's form may be a timely or
discretionary amendment, as discussed in section I(A) above. In addi-
tion, although the IRS issues a favorable qualification letter, a plan may
nevertheless have form defects which were not corrected in the qualifica-
tion process. Thus, there may be errors in the eligibility computation
period or integration formula69 which could lead to operational, and even
discriminatory, problems. In these circumstances, the plan may invoke
section 7805(b) to preserve its qualified status. Section 7805(b) provides:
"The Secretary . . . may prescribe the extent, if any, to which
any ruling or regulation, relating to the Internal Revenue laws, shall be
applied without retroactive effect.'70
Under this provision, the Secretary of the Treasury will not revoke a
determination letter ruling, except in unusual circumstances, if the fol-
lowing criteria are met:71
(i) there has been no misstatement or omission of material facts
in the application; 72
68. See notes 69-88 infra and accompanying text.
69. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(5).
70. I.R.C. § 7805(b) was originally enacted in the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §
1314, 42 Stat. 227 (current version at I.R.C. § 7805(b)). This provision was enacted to
prevent undue hardship resulting from changes in newly issued Treasury Department
regulations. J. SEiDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 886-87
(1938). I.R.C. § 7805(b) finally took its present form in 1934. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,
§ 506, 48 Stat. 680 (now I.R.C. § 7805(b)).
This section grants considerable discretion to the Secretary to apply his decisions
(whether by regulation or ruling) retroactively. This authority, however, must not be
abused. Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Niagara Hudson Power
Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336 (1951); LeSavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d
589 (3d Cir. 1956); United States ex rel. Adamantides v. Neely, 191 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.
1951); H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951); Valley Mold & Iron Corp. v.
NLRB, 116 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1940); Merlin Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F. 2d 586 (2d
Cir. 1940). Cf. Ludden v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. -, [1977] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Dec.
34,610 (Commissioner did not abuse his discretion where there were no statutory
criteria to provide him with guidance in circumstances in issue).
71. See Rogovin, The Four R's, Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity-A
View From Within, reprinted in STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 5980A.0152-.0157. See
also 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 2, § 49.95; I.R.M.-Audit 45(10) § 711(1).
72. It is extremely important that full disclosure of all facts necessary for a determina-
tion letter be made in the application. Absent full disclosure, I.R.C. § 7805(b) is useless.
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(ii) the facts subsequently developed are not materially different
from the facts upon which the ruling was based;
(iii) there has been no change in the applicable law;73
(iv) the ruling was issued with respect to a prospective or pro-
posed transaction; 74 and
(v) the taxpayer acted in good faith in relying on the ruling and
the retroactive revocation will be to his detriment.75
A similar test, under Revenue Procedure 72-3, is applied to revenue
rulings which may affect the plan's continued qualification.76
With respect to form defects, the requirements of section 7805(b) and
Revenue Procedure 72-3 are relatively easy to meet. Full disclosure of all
the material facts,77 and operation of the plan in accordance with its exact
terms, will demonstrate the critical elements of full disclosure and re-
liance.78 The third essential element in a section 7805(b) test-that the
facts subsequently developed are not materially different than the facts as
submitted-should not be particularly important in a defense to form
defects.
The final defense to a form defect discovered in an IRS audit is an
extension of the Tax Court's holding in Aero Rental v. Commissioner.79
Specifically, if the operation of a plan is not actually affected by a plan
provision or its absence, it should be possible to amend retroactively the
plan's form."
See, e.g., Lowry Hosp. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 850 (1976); Harwood Assocs. v.
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 255 (1974); Lorain Ave. Clinic, 31 T.C. 141 (1958).
73. Until all the rules of ERISA are established, there will continue to be major
changes in the applicable law, which may prevent extensive use of either I.R.C. § 7805(b)
or Rev. Proc. 72-3 defenses to retroactive revocation of a plan's qualified status. It is
hoped, however, that a liberal, and practical, interpretation of this requirement by the IRS
will alleviate some of the difficulties encountered by all plans attempting to comply with
ERISA.
74. It is generally recognized that plan determination letters fall within the "prospec-
tive" category: a plan, thus, has little practical difficulty satisfying this element. See
Rogovin, supra note 71, 5980A.0157.
75. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (transaction
consummated, thus no acts constituting basis for reliance); Bornstein v. United States,
345 F.2d 558 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (reliance not proved). Administration in accordance with a
plan's exact terms may provide proof of the taxpayer's reliance and should be applied to
both form and operational problems that result from form defects.
76. Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 C.B. 698, § 13.05.
77. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
78. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
79. 64 T.C. 331 (1975); see notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 14-35 supra.
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B. Operational Considerations
As noted earlier, there are several categories of operational prob-
lems-minor, bookkeeping-administrative, and major. Time Oil Co.
v. Commissioner81 provides the primary defense to disqualification of a
plan for a minor operational problem discovered either in the audit or
self-review process.
If the IRS discovers a bookkeeping-administrative error during an
audit, the issues raised in the Quality Brands, Ludden, Forsyth trilogy82
become relevant. The emergence of a doctrine that would allow volun-
tary, retroactive cure of bookkeeping errors would have a direct impact
on the IRS's treatment of similar plan errors discovered in the audit
process. In fact, despite the hard line taken by Judge Dawson in Forsyth,
other courts have developed a more reasonable approach to the problem
of retroactive cures. In Quinn v. United States,83 which preceded the
Quality Brands trilogy, a district court considered whether a plan's
qualified status should be revoked for the disbursement of "improperly"
contributed funds to an improper plan "participant. '" 84 The court, rea-
soning that a plan should not be severely penalized when there has been
no irrevocable benefit to the employer or prejudice to the employee,
flatly rejected the IRS's effort to disqualify the entire plan. 85 The court
suggested alternative means to cure future occurrences of this particular
problem which would preclude the harsh consequences of disqualifica-
tion. 86
81. 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958); see notes 38-42 supra.
82. See notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text.
83. 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,863 (D. Md. 1976).
84. In Quinn, the corporation deducted, as compensation, money paid to the stock-
holder president's father, who was 85 years of age and sick. Since the compensation was
unreasonable under I.R.C. § 162(a), the contribution should not have been made to the
company's profit sharing plan for the father.
85. 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,866-68 (D. Md. 1976).
86. The court in Quinn suggested two solutions to this problem, which was com-
plicated because the funds in issue had already been distributed to the father's estate.
First, the corporation's deduction would simply be disallowed in an amount equal to the
unreasonable compensation. Secondly, the company would make a nondeductible contri-
bution, equal to the disbursement, and effect a retroactive reallocation of the amounts in
issue. The court noted that if the distribution to the estate had not been made, the plan's
existing trust funds could easily be reallocated.
This philosophy echoes the Ninth Circuit's in Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d
237 (9th Cir. 1958), and the Tax Court's in Aero Rental v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 331
(1975); it has traditionally been well received by some IRS agents.
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If the IRS discovers a serious, discriminatory operational defect in the
audit process, such as a coverage, vesting, exclusive benefit, or pro-
hibited group problem, the plan will have little success effecting volun-
tary solutions. In this context, the application of section 7805(b) is also
somewhat limited, although arguably it may be applied to those opera-
tional defects that arise out of a literal application of the plan's qualified
and approved form.87 In those situations in which operational problems
are not directly related to the plan's form, section 7805(b) may not be
applicable because two elements of the test, that there is no omission of
material facts and that the discriminatory, operational facts are not mate-
rially different from the facts in the application, 88 will be difficult to fulfull.
Because of the highly technical and factual nature of non-form related
operational problems, it would be unusual if the same facts involved in
the IRS's audit finding were required, or even considered in the determi-
nation letter process. A theoretical solution to this problem, and a
possible means to invoke section 7805(b) in any serious, operational
defect circumstance, would be to link the foreseeability and inevitability
of a plan form defect to the actual operational problem in issue. This
would obviate the requirement that intense factual disclosure has been
associated with the application.
IV. THE TAX EFFECTS OF A PLAN'S DISQUALIFICATION
There are direct and immediate tax effects on the employees, the
87. Some examples of I.R.C. § 7805(b)'s application may be as follows:
(1) A § 7805(b) application should be successful if a plan is found not to integrate
properly where the formula for integration was applied as written in the plan, and
approved in the qualification process, but did not integrate correctly at that time. Of
course, the IRS will insist on prospective changes if the plan is to maintain its qualified
status.
(2) A § 7805(b) application should also be successful if a plan received a favorable
determination letter based on salaried-only employee coverage, but upon audit the cover-
age, in effect, was found to be discriminatory. Nevertheless, if the facts developed on
audit are substantially the same facts on which the letter was based, the determination
letter will not be revoked retroactively. Again, prospective changes may be needed to
preserve the continuing qualified status of the plan.
(3) A § 7805(b) application would probably not be successful in an IRS challenge to a
vesting formula's alleged discriminatory application that is based on employee turnover,
because usually no turnover information is submitted with an application for determina-
tion. Thus, the second element may not be present because the subsequently developed
facts cannot be compared to the facts on which the determination letter was based.
88. The IRS, however, has on occasion utilized § 7805(b) to preserve the continuing
tax qualification of pension plans that have operational problems when necessary to
protect and benefit the plan's participants.
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employer, and the trust associated with a plan that becomes disqual-
ified.8 9
A. Effects on the Employees
Section 402(b), entitled "Taxability of Beneficiary of Nonexempt
Trust," provides:
Contributions to an employees' trust made by an employer during a
taxable year of the employer which ends within or with a taxable
year of the trust for which the trust is not exempt from tax under
section 501(a) shall be included in the gross income of the employee
in accordance with section 83 (relating to property transferred in
connection with performance of services), except that the value of
the employee's interest in the trust shall be substituted for the fair
market value of the property for purposes of applying such section.
The amount actually distributed or made available to any distributee
by any such trust shall be taxable to him in the year in which so
distributed or made available, under section 72 (relating to an-
nuities), except that distributions of income of such trust before the
annuity starting date (as defined in section 72(c)(4)) shall be in-
cluded in the gross income of the employee without regard to
section 72(e)(1) (relating to amount not received as annuities). A
beneficiary of any such trust shall not be considered the owner of
any portion of such trust under subpart E of part I of subchapter J
(relating to grantors and others treated as substantial owners).
This section is composed of three sentences and each will be examined
separately. It must be noted that this provision encompasses both non-
qualified and disqualified plans. The former were never intended to be
qualified under section 401(a), while the latter are plans that were, but
are no longer, qualified.
(i) First Sentence of Section 402(b)
The first sentence of section 402(b) was significantly revised as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969,90 effective on August 1, 1969. Prior to that
date, the first sentence of section 402(b) provided as follows:
Contributions to an employees' trust made by an employer during a
taxable year of the employer which ends within or with a taxable
year of the trust for which the trust is not exempt from tax under
89. Once the IRS has made a final, adverse determination with respect to a plan's
qualified status, it may be appealed to the United States Tax Court, see I.R.C. § 7476, or
the district courts, see I.R.C. § 7422.
90. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 321(b)(1), 83 Stat. 487.
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section 501(a) shall be included in the gross income of an employee
for the taxable year in which the contribution is made to the trust in
the case of an employee whose beneficial interest in such contribu-
tion is nonforfeitable at the time the contribution is made.91
The italicized language required a participant in a disqualified plan to
include in his income the nonforfeitable contribution to that plan which
was made for him by an employer. An employee's interest in such a
contribution was "nonforfeitable" only if "at the time the contribution
was made . . . there [was] no contingency under the plan which may
cause the employee to lose his rights in the contribution."92 Thus, if a
plan contained any contingent provisions that might cause an employee
to lose any or all of his rights, 93 or if the employee's interest became
nonforfeitable in a year other than the year the contribution was made,
94
the employee did not have to include in his gross income his interest in an
employer's contribution to a disqualified plan.
The italicized language was, however, deleted by the 1969 changes
and, in lieu thereof, section 402(b) was amended to incorporate the
provisions of section 83, which provides in pertinent part: 95
(a) General Rule-If, in connection with the performance of serv-
ices, property is transferred to any person other than the person for
whom such services are performed, the excess of-
(1) the fair market value of such property (determined without
regard to any restriction other than a restriction which by its
terms will never lapse) at the first time the rights of the person
having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or
are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever
occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property ....
91. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 402(b), 68A Stat. 3 (emphasis
added).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-I(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 245 (emphasis added).
The current regulations under I.R.C. § 402(b) have not been changed to account for the
1969 revision.
93. Many plans had "bad boy" clauses which could create a forfeiture of a partici-
pant's entire interest if he were "disloyal," "dishonest," committed a "crime," or
"competed" against or toward the employer. Under pre-ERISA law, although there was a
split in authority, such clauses were generally enforceable. ERISA has for the most part
eliminated bad boy clauses. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4(c) Ex. 1.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(a)(1), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 244.
95. For a history of I.R.C. § 83, see J. MERTFNS, supra note 2, Commentary § 83.
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The section 83 phrase "fair market value of the property" is specifi-
cally replaced in section 402(b) with "the value of the employee's
interest in the trust." One obvious impact of this 1969 revision is to
impose a section 83 test on section 402(b) and thus accelerate the time
and broaden the conditions under which the employee must include in
income the employer contributions to a disqualified plan.
In June, 1971, the Commissioner issued proposed regulations for the
new section 402(b). Although these regulations have not been finalized,
close scrutiny is necessary to determine the current IRS interpretation of
section 402(b).1
The proposed regulations are divided into four subsections. The first
discusses the taxation of plan participants resulting from employer contri-
butions made after August 1, 1969;97 the second 98 deals with the taxation
of plan participants when their rights in a nonexempt trust change from
"nonvested" to "vested." These two subsections correspond to the first
sentence of section 402(b). The third subsection99 relates to the second
sentence of section 402(b) which concerns the taxation of distributions
from a nonexempt trust under section 501(b); this second sentence will
be examined separately."00 The final subsection' 01 addresses the taxation
of plan participants by reason of employer contributions made on or
before August 1, 1969, and corresponds with the section 402(b) regula-
tions technically now in effect. In addition to the proposed regulations for
section 402(b), the Commissioner has issued proposed regulations for
section 83.102
The first subsection of the proposed regulations to section 402(b)
would include in an employee's income any employer contribution made
on behalf of an employee after August 1, 1969, to a trust which, in that
year, is not exempt under section 501(a). The inclusion, however, is only
to the extent that the employee's interest in such contribution is "vested"
96. See Prop. Reg. § 1.402(b) (1971).
97. Id. § 1.402(b)-I(a).
98. Id. § 1.402(b)-1(b).
99. Id. § 1.402(b)-I(c).
100. See notes 135-49 infra and accompanying text.
101. See Prop. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(d) (1971).
102. See Prop. Regs. §§ 1.83-1 to 1.83-8. The proposed regulations to both I.R.C. §§ 83
and 402(b) were issued on June 3, 1971, yet neither are final.
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at the time it was made. 10 3 "Vested" refers to the employee's beneficial
interest in such contribution (or premium) which is "transferable" or
"not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture."'" "Transferable," in
this context, means that a plan participant's rights in the property can be
transferred to any person other than the transferor of the property, but
only if such rights are not subject to substantial risk of forfeiture. 0 5
Because of the limited rights of a plan participant to assign, pledge, or
alienate plan benefits, "transferability" is not crucial." The concept of
,'substantial risk of forfeiture," however, is critical under this regula-
tion, in assessing whether an employee's beneficial interest is "vested."
The proposed regulations to section 83 provide that the rights of a
person are subject to a "substantial risk of forfeiture" if such person's
rights to full enjoyment of the property are conditioned upon the future
performance, or the refraining from the performance, of substantial
services by any individual. 1°" Despite some general guidelines, 0 8
whether "services" are "substantial" will be judged on all the facts and
circumstances.' °9 Some specific exceptions are provided in the regula-
tions, however, and a plan provision which causes an employee to return
or lose his interest if he commits a crime will not be considered a
substantial risk of forfeiture." 0 Similarly, an anticompetiton or consul-
ting agreement will not ordinarily be considered a substantial risk of
forfeiture."' The proposed regulations set forth several examples of the
application of these rules;" 2 one particularly relevant example, similar to
a graded vesting schedule of a plan, is as follows:
103. See Prop. Reg. § 1.402(b)-I(a)(1) (1971).
104. Id. § 1.402(b)-l(a)(2).
105. See I.R.C. § 83(c)(2); Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(c) (1971).
106. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13).
107. See Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (1971).
108. The proposed regulation states only: "The regularity of the performance of
services and the time spent in performing such services tend to indicate whether services
are substantial. In addition, the fact that the person performing such services has the right
to decline to perform such services may tend to establish that services are insubstantial."
Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Tax Court, in Burnetta v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 387 (1977) has accepted
this position. The Tax Court has also concluded that a "dishonesty," "bad-boy" clause
will not constitute a substantial risk of forfeiture. See Ludden v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.
-, [1977] TAx. CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,610.
111. See Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (1971).
112. Id. § 1.83-3(c)(2) Ex. 1-4.
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On November 25, 1971, corporation X gives to E, an employee, in
connection with his performance of services to corporation X, a
bonus of 100 shares of corporation X stock. Under the terms of the
bonus arrangement E is obligated to return the corporation X stock
to corporation X if he terminates his employment for any reason.
However, for each year occurring after November 25, 1971, during
which E remains employed by corporation X, E ceases to be ob-
ligated to return 10 shares of the corporation X stock. Since in each
year occuring after November 25, 1971, for which E remains em-
ployed he is not required to return 10 shares of corporation X's
stock, E's rights in 10 shares each year for 10 years cease to be
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture for each year he remains so
employed.113
The first subsection of the section 402(b) proposed regulations also
determines the amount of the employer's contribution attributable to the
employee. 114 In defined contribution plans," 5 individual accounts are
maintained so that the amount of the employer's contribution per partici-
pant is easily determinable. In defined benefit plans, 1 6 however, the
employer's contribution to each plan participant is determined by a
specific formula," 7 or by other generally accepted actuarial principles. 118
The proposed rules and definitions are illustrated by an example:
Assume a profit sharing plan was initially adopted and established
on January 1, 1976 by a single corporate employer, which corpora-
tion was formed on January 1, 1965. Both the employer and the trust
use the calendar year for federal income tax purposes. The profit
sharing plan provides for immediate participation and a vesting
schedule of ten percent per year for each year of service, with full
vesting after ten years of service and with all years of an employee's
service, even those prior to the adoption of the plan, credited. There
are no plan provisions providing for divestment for cause or other-
wise. On December 31, 1976, Employee A had ten years of service,
Employee B had five years of service, and Employee C had one
year of service. The employer makes a contribution on December
31, 1976 which is allocated to each employee as follows: A -
$3,000.00, B - $2,000.00, and C - $1,000.00. If the trust of this
plan is not exempt for the year 1976, each employee would have to
113. Id. at Ex. 2.
114. Id. § 1.402(b)-1(a)(3).
115. See Act § 3(34).
116. Id. § 3(35).
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include in his gross income the following amounts: A-$3,000.00,
B-$1,000.00, and C-$100.00, which is determined by taking the
employer's allocated contribution and multiplying by the partici-
pant's vested interest.
The employees in the above hypothetical would be charged with
income even though they were not in receipt of cash. 119 In addition, the
employee and employer may be subject to withholding and social securi-
ty tax liability on the amount of the employee's income. 120 Despite these
results, this is a correct application of the statutory requirements of
section 402(b). If the plan in the above hypothetical were requalified for
1977 and subsequent years, the trust would be exempt from taxation
under section 501(a) and the employees would not be required to include
in their income any additional employer contributions to the plan.121
The second subparagraph of the proposed regulations to section 402(b)
is much broader in its potential impact on the participants in a plan that
loses its qualified status. The proposed regulation 122 provides in part:
119. The final determination with respect to a plan's disqualification usually occurs
several years after the contribution was made, which means the employee would also owe
interest on any additional income taxes. Disqualification of a plan alters its function;
rather than being a "fringe benefit," it almost immediately becomes a detriment, because
the employee must pay income taxes with his own after tax dollars without receiving any
funds from the plan. In addition, the employee's tax return will be subjected to at least a
cursory IRS audit. Even if the employer awarded "bonuses" to employees to cover their
tax liability, the bonuses would be subject to still additional income taxes. Note, however,
that any amount included in his income would be added to the employee's basis and
applied against any amounts later distributed to him. See Prop. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(b)(5)
(1971).
120. See notes 154-56 infra and accompanying text.
121. See Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(i), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 234.
122. Prop. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(b)(l) (1971) (emphasis added). An equally important part
of this regulation provides:
If rights of an employee under a trust during a taxable year of the employee
(ending after August 1, 1969) which ends within or with a taxable year of the trust
for which the trust is not exempt under section 501(a) change from nonvested to
vested, the value of the employee's interest in the trust on the date of such change
shall. . . be included in his gross income for the taxable year.
This proposed regulation would have a dramatic impact on a plan over the period of
disqualified, and hence taxable, years, if the plan had graded, or full vesting, and
contributions were made. It would cause employees in such plans to include in income not
only the current year's vested contributions but also the value of his vested interest in
prior contributions to a disqualified plan that had become vested. For example, assume
that a profit sharing plan is established in 1975, that a participant shall be vested at the rate
of 20% for each year of service, that in each year from 1975 through 1979 inclusive,
contributions are made and the amounts are allocated to the participant's separate ac-
counts, and that the plan had been disqualified in all these years; the tax effects for a
hypothetical participant would be as follows:
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If an employee's rights in a trust which is exempt under section
501(a) are fully vested 123 at a time when such trust ceases to be so
exempt, then such employee must include the value of his interest in
such trust in his gross income as compensation for his taxable year
which ends within or with the taxable year of the trust in which it
ceases to be so exempt.
The proposed regulations do not define "rights" ;124 however, the
phrase "value of an employee's interest in a trust" is specifically defined
as the amount of the employee's beneficial interest (whether or not
I 2 3 4 5 6 7
Account Balance Income
Accumulated from Income From 4- Total Income
Contribution % Disqualified From Nonvested and Tax to
Year Made in Vested Contributions 2 Vested Participant
1975 1000 20% 1000 200 - 200
1976 1500 40% 2500 600 500 1100
1977 1500 60% 4000 900 800 1700
1978 1500 80% 5500 1200 1100 2300
1979 2000 100% 7500 2000 1500 3500
7500 8800
This proposed regulation works properly in a situation similar to that in Burnetta v.
Commissioner, 68 T.C. 387 (1977). In Burnetta, the defined contribution plans provided
that a participant would be fully vested after two years of participation. The plans were
initially adopted in 1970, but were disqualified from the outset because they failed to
satisfy the coverage requirements. In 1970 and 1971 the IRS disallowed the corporation's
deduction for its contribution to the plan and Burnetta, the only participant, did not realize
income from these contributions. In 1972, the corporation again made a contribution.
Because Burnetta was fully vested in 1972, the corporation finally received a deduction
for its 1970, 1971, and 1972 contributions, and Burnetta recognized income from all prior
years' contributions in one year. The IRS treated the trust as a separate taxpayer for each
year it was disqualified, and thus it had to pay taxes on its earnings.
123. Prop. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(b)(4)(1971) addresses the question of partial vesting, but
apparently only in the context of the sentence (and principle) reviewed in note 122 supra.
The proposed regulation provides, in pertinent part:
If, during any taxable year of an employee, only part of his rights under an
employee's trust which is not exempt under section 501 (a) changes from non-
vested to vested, then only the corresponding part of the value of the employee's
interest in such trust is includible in the employee's gross income for such taxable
year. (emphasis added).
This regulation leaves unresolved the interesting issue, under the proposed regulation
cited in the text, whether a partially vested participant in a disqualified plan would have to
include his previously vested value in his income, upon disqualification of the plan.
124. The phrase "rights" appears throughout the proposed regulation to I.R.C. §
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vested) in the "net fair market value'' 125 of all the assets in such trust as
of the day such employee's interest in the trust changes from nonvested
to vested. 126 The apparent authority for this part of the proposed regula-
tion is the caveat in section 402(b) that "the value of the employee's
interest in the trust shall be substituted for the fair market value of the
property for the purposes of applying" section 83 to section 402(b). 127
A strict application of this proposed regulation can be illustrated by an
example:
Assume a profit sharing plan was established by a corporate em-
ployer in 1970. The plan provides for eligibility after two years of
service, full vesting, 128 and contains no forfeiture-type clauses.
Both the employer and the plan are on a calendar year basis for
federal income tax purposes. There is no plan contribution made in
or for 1976. In 1976, the plan becomes disqualified. The full account
balance of each plan participant would, under the proposed regula-
tions, be included in the income of each participant for 1976.129
Where a participant would be charged income based upon a prior
year's contribution to a plan that has lost its qualified status, the result
suggested by the second subsection of the proposed regulations is over-
stated. Section 402(b) addresses only "contributions 130 to an employees'
trust. . . which ends within or with a taxable year of the trust for which
the trust is not exempt from tax under section 501(a)." Accordingly, the
reference in 402(b) to section 83, as well as the caveat in section 402(b)
which substitutes the phrase "value of employee's interest" for section
125. Prop. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(b)(2) (1971) states as follows:
The net fair market value of all the assets in a trust is the total amount of the fair
market values. . . of all the assets in the trust less the amount of all the liabilities(including taxes) to which such assets are subject or which such trust has as-
sumed (other than the rights of any employee in such assets), as of any day when
an employee's interest in such trust changes from nonvested to vested.
126. See id. § 1.402(b)-1(b)(2).
127. See I.R.C. § 402(b); text accompanying note 95 supra.
128. Under ERISA, plans that require more than a one year eligibility period must
provide full and immediate vesting. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(B)(i).
129. This tax result occurs regardless of how or why the plan became disqualified, and
of the resulting hardship on the employees. In addition to those hardships noted in note
119 supra, the trust would be subject to income tax liability, see notes 157-73 infra, and
accompanying text, which would obviously reduce the trust's assets and, consequently,
the amounts available to the participants.
130. It is interesting to note that the statutory phrase in I.R.C. § 402(b) is
"[c]ontributions," in the plural, while the language it refers to is for "a taxable year," in
the singular. The use of the plural is not a basis for aggregating several years of contribu-
tions, but rather can be read to refer to a series of timely made contributions within one
year for the benefit of all employees. (emphasis added).
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83's "fair market value of the property" must be similarly interpreted,
limited, understood, and applied. Thus, section 83's application within
section 402(b), which determines the income inclusion of the participants
in a disqualified plan, is limited only to the contribution(s) made during
the year(s) which the trust was not exempt. The phrase "value of an
interest" in section 402(b) should not include any contributions made to
a plan in a year(s) other than the year(s) in which the trust was not
exempt under section 501(a).131
This interpretation of section 402(b) is consistent with the basic tenet
of pension plan law that the qualified status of a plan is to be determined
on a yearly basis. 132 It also parallels the language of the regulations which
provide:
[a]n employer makes a contribution for the benefit of an employee
to a trust described in section 401(a) for the taxable year of the
employer which ends within or with a taxable year of the trust for
which the trust is exempt under section 501(a), the employee is not
required to include such contribution in his income. 133
Furthermore, as a matter of equity, an interpretation that limits the
income attributable to an employee to the contribution(s) for each year(s)
the plan is disqualified, encourages a plan to requalify without financially
debilitating either the plan or its participants. Finally, this interpretation
of section 402(b) is consistent with the third sentence of section 402(b)
which states that income earned in a nonexempt trust shall not be charged
to the participants. Despite this statutory provision, the Commissioner
has interpreted the "value of an employee's interest" in a defined
contribution plan to include income realized over the entire term of the
employee's participation in the plan as reflected in his account balance at
the time of the plan's disqualification.
It is submitted, based on the above analysis, that when a qualified plan
loses its qualified status a participant will realize income only to the
extent of his vested contribution made to the plan during its disqualified
tax year. This result is contrary to the proposed regulation's position
which treats the full previously accrued account balance as realized
131. Similarly, the change of a participant's interest from partially (or wholly) nonvest-
ed to vested would be limited to the vested value attributable to the contribution made in a
year the plan was not qualified and the trust not exempt. See, e.g., note 122 supra. This
interpretation would prevent an inequitable bunching of income from prior years' contri-
butions when a qualified plan first loses its qualified status.
132. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(i), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 234 (emphasis added).
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income, but is the result recently reached, without analysis, by the Tax
Court in Feroleto Steel Co. v. Commissioner.134
(ii) Second Sentence of Section 402(b)
The meaning of the second sentence of section 402(b) turns on the
phrases "actually distributed" and "made available:" "actually dis-
tributed" concerns the actual receipt of funds whereas "made available"
deals with constructive receipt. Although neither the current nor the
proposed regulations to section 402(b) discuss the meaning of "made
available," section 402(a)(2) incorporates this language. Revenue Rul-
ing 55-423131 concerns section 402(a)(2) and provides some guidance:
A participant's interest in such a [qualified] trust is not made avail-
able to him unless and until it is unconditionally credited to or set
apart for him and made subject to his withdrawal or other disposi-
tion. Conditions upon such withdrawal or disposition which are
without substance however, are not deemed to prevent the partici-
pant's interest from being made available.... Most cases in which
the issue arises as to whether a participant's interest has been made
available fall into two general classes, namely, (1) penalties for
withdrawal, and (2) a prior irrevocable election to defer distribution
to a fixed or determinable future time.136
134. 69 T.C. -, [1977] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 34,610. The Research Institute of
America, in its January 19, 1978, Weekly Alert, indicated that the final regulations
(presumably under I.R.C. § 402) may give employees of disqualified plans some relief by
not taxing them immediately on employer contributions that vest in them.
135. 1955-1 C.B. 41. See also Leavens v. Commissioner, 467 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1972).
136. The revenue ruling continues:
In the penalty type of case a participant, who makes a withdrawal, is required to
discontinue his participation in the trust or suffer a forfeiture with respect to a
portion of his distributable interest. Discontinuance of participation is the surren-
der of a valuable right and, as long as that remains a condition for withdrawal of
his interest, such interest is not made available to the participant.
Another example of a penalty type of case is a six month suspension of participation. See
Rev. Rul. 58-230, 1958-1 C.B. 204.
Revenue Ruling 55-423 also states:
In the deferment by prior election type of case, if the trust indenture, or the
plan of which it is a part, provides for an irrevocable election by the employee
prior to the time his interest becomes distributable to him to have distribution of
such interest deferred to a fixed or determinable future time, such as ten years or
upon his prior retirement, severance of employment, death, or disability, his
interest is not made available prior to such time or occurrence of any of the
events enumerated. So long as an employee's election to defer the actual receipt
is irrevocable, it is immaterial whether the exercise thereof takes the form of
positive action or merely inaction on the part of the employee.
In both situations, the conditions must be consequential and of substance to prevent
constructive receipt. Another means of preventing employer contributions from being
Imade available" on withdrawal is to interpose an administrative committee which must
approve financial need in order to disburse funds. See Rev. Rul. 71-332, 1971-2 C.B. 210;
Rev. Rul. 55-424, 1955-1 C.B. 42.
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If a plan is disqualified and funds are either "made available" or
"actually distributed" to plan participants, they would be subject to
taxation under the second sentence of section 402(b). 137 Two cases
consider the question of "how much" taxation will result.
In Greenwald v. Commissioner,138 Interstate Hosiery Mill, Inc., es-
tablished a profit sharing plan for its employees which received IRS
approval in May, 1945.1 In 1953, the assets of Interstate'were acquired
by another company, and fifty-nine of sixty plan participants left the
employ of Interstate."4 Only Mr. Greenwald remained with the company
and a participant in the plan. In 1954, the fifty-nine participants received
their full distribution from the plan; at that time, Mr. Greenwald had
$90,281.08 in his account. 141 Interstate became an investment corpora-
tion and remained in business until 1959, when it sold its assets. No
contributions were made to the plan from 1954 through 1959. The plan
was terminated in 1959, and Mr. Greenwald received cash and property
valued at $168,922.55, which he reported as capital gains in his 1959
income tax return.
The Commissioner argued that because the plan was not qualified,'42
the distribution to Mr. Greenwald was from a disqualified plan, and was
to be taxed at ordinary income rates. The Second Circuit agreed that the
plan was not qualified after 1954, but held the amount in Greenwald's
account as of 1954 ($90,281.08) was only subject to taxation at capital
gain rates. The court reasoned that the other employees had "most
probably received capital gains treatment as to the amounts distributed to
them. It would be harsh to treat the taxpayer differently, merely because
he stayed on with the same employer after the radical transformation of
its business." 143 In support of its decision, the court explained:
137. Three additional notes are necessary: If income had been realized from prior
I.R.C. § 402(b) applications, the participants would be credited with basis in the amount of
the prior income recognized. Second, the application of the second sentence is intertwined
with I.R.C. § 72. Third, income averaging is available. See I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305.
138. 366 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1966).
139. Between 1945 and 1953, the plan made several amendments, all of which received
IRS approval. Id. at 539.
140. This presumably was treated as a partial termination. See Rev. Rul. 73-284, 1973-2
C.B. 139.
141. 366 F.2d at 539.
142. The Commissioner argued that because the plan covered only one employee, it
had become discriminatory in its operation. This argument, resisted vigorously by the
taxpayer, was accepted by the Second Circuit. Today, however, a one-man plan may be
permissible, even if the participant is the sole shareholder, highest paid employee, or
officer.
143. 366 F.2d at 541.
[Vol. 1977:565
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss4/2
KEEPING THE QUALIFIED PENSION PLAN QUALIFIED 595
Nor is such harshness required by the statute. Section 402(a)(2)
affords capital gains treatment to distributions payable "in the case
of" exempt trusts. Section 402(b) provides that distributions dis-
tributed or made available . . . should be taxable as ordinary in-
come. There is no reason in the statute or elsewhere why we should
not consider that portion of the 1959 distribution equivalent to the
amount standing to taxpayer's credit in the profit-sharing trust be-
fore it became discriminatory in operation, as a distribution from an
exempt trust, and so entitled to capital gains treatment. The remain-
der of the 1959 distribution represents a distribution from a dis-
criminatory trust, and so is properly includible in taxpayer's 1959
income at ordinary income rates. Such a result seems consistent
with the underlying purpose of the statute, since it affords capital
gains treatment only so long as a profit-sharing trust remains nondis-
criminatory in operation. Moreover, the result gains support in the
language of § 402(b), which envisages a year by year consideration
of whether or not a profit-sharing trust is tax-exempt.144
Pitt v. United States14 followed Greenwald. In 1959, the Floridia
Machine Products Company established a qualified profit sharing plan.
Because of certain prohibited transactions, 146 however, the plan lost its
qualified status in 1969. Upon termination in 1970, the plan requested a
determination letter. The IRS concluded that the trust associated with this
plan was not exempt, and the long term capital gains provisions of
section 402(a)(2) were not applicable. Pitt received $17,605.44 from the
plan upon its termination, which he reported on his 1970 income tax
return as a capital gain. The district court accepted the conclusion that the
plan had not regained its qualified status in 1970, the year of the
distribution. The issue before the court, however, was whether the IRS
"properly denied capital gains treatment to the entire amount of the
distribution." 147 The Commissioner argued that the entire distribution to
Pitt was taxable at ordinary income rates because it was received after the
trust lost its tax exempt status. The taxpayer, on the other hand, claimed
that only the amount contributed to the plan after revocation of its tax
exempt status was subject to taxation at ordinary income rates. The court,
relying on Greenwald, held that Pitt was entitled to capital gains treat-
ment on the amount of the distribution that was contributed while the
144. Id.
145. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,244 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
146. A plan cannot be disqualfied for engaging in prohibited transactions under
ERISA; such transactions are subject to excise taxes. See I.R.C. § 4975.
147. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,244.
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plan's trust was exempt and that the balance of the distribution, which
resulted from contributions made after the plan was disqualified, was
subject to taxation at ordinary income rates.
These cases establish that, with respect to the amounts actually dis-
tributed from a disqualified plan, the participant could receive "credit"
for the contribution and increments made while the plan was qualified.
The amount so "credited" to him would be the account balance or
accrued benefit as of the last date of the plan's qualification. This may
enable a participant to claim the benefits of capital gains treatment on at
least part of his distribution. Under ERISA, although capital gains
treatment still exists, 14 8 the lump sum distribution rules' 49 may yield
more favorable tax results than capital gains treatment. A taxpayer
relying on Greenwald and Pitt should be able to argue for lump sum
distribution treatment or that portion of the distribution from a disqual-
ified plan attributable to the plan's qualified years while accepting regu-
lar, ordinary income treatment on the balance of such a distribution.
(iii) Third Sentence of Section 402(b)
The third sentence of section 402(b) provides that participants in
disqualified plans will not be treated as owners of the trust in issue, and
therefore will not be charged with income from the trust's earnings. The
trust, as a separate taxpayer, will bear the income tax burden on its
earnings.
B. Effects on the Employer
An employer's contributions to a qualified plan are deductible within
the limits set forth in section 404(a)(1),(2), and (3).150 Section 404(a)(5)
provides that contributions to nonqualified plans are also deductible "in
the taxable year in which an amount attributable to the contribution is
includible in the gross income of employees participating in the plan,
but, in the case of a plan in which more than one employee participates
only if separate accounts are maintained for each employee."' 51 Under
148. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(2).
149. See I.R.C. §§ 402, 4972. Query: if tax treatment can be split, can the amount
attributable to the cjualified plan portion of a split distribution be "rolled over" under
I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)?
150. I.R.C. § 404(a) also refers to the I.R.C. § 162 and LR.C. § 212 requirements to
sustain a deduction.
151. The existing regulations to I.R.C. § ,404(a)(5) are not helpful for the post-1969
period because they do hot reflect the amendment to I.R.C. § 402(b). This regulation,
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-(12) (1956), is based on the concept of "nonforfeitability" as
[Vol. 1977:565
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this provision, an employer who makes contributions to a plan that
becomes disqualified will generally be allowed a deduction only in a
defined contribution plan and then only to the extent the employees
recognize income under section 402(b).152 If the plan is a defined benefit
plan with more than one employee, a deduction probably 53 would not be
allowed because separate accounts are not maintained.
The second impact on the disqualified plan's sponsoring employer is a
potential liability for FICA and FUTA taxes. 54 Although qualified plans
are clearly exempt from such tax liability, 55 the Code and regulations are
silent with respect to the proper withholding tax treatment of contribu-
tions to disqualified plans. 156
C. Effects on the Trust
A trust 57 is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) only as long as
the plan, which is part of the trust, is qualified under section 401(a);
defined in Treas. Reg. §1.402(b)-l(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6783, 1965-1 C.B.180. A proposed regula-
tion, Prop. Reg. § 1.404(a)-(12), was issued in June, 1971, but has not become permanent.
152. The employer may take as a deduction amounts contributed to a defined contribu-
tion plan despite the exclusion provided in I.R.C. § 101(b). See Prop. Reg. § 1.404(a)-
(12)(b)(1) (1971). The proposed regulations do not resolve the issue of whether an employ-
er may deduct the trust earnings which are includible in the employee's income under
I.R.C. § 404(a)(5). When a participant recognizes income under the second sentence of
I.R.C. § 402(b) because of a distribution from a disqualified plan, the amount may include
trust earnings (or losses). The question then is whether those trust earnings constitute "an
amount attributable to the contribution . . . includible in the gross income of" an
employee for deduction purposes by an employer under I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (emphasis
added).
153. Under some actuarially sound funding methods-i.e., a level premium insured
account plan-separate accounts are maintained in defined benefit plans, which would
entitle the employer to a deduction as set forth in I.R.C. § 404(a)(5). If this type of plan
funding is not used, the deduction for contributions to a defined benefit plan may be lost.
But even in this situation, the participant in a defined benefit plan will recognize income to
the extent he is vested. See notes 115-19 supra and accompanying text.
154. See I.R.C. 88 3121, 3306.
155. Id. § 3121(a)(5), 3306(b)(5).
156. In this context, it is interesting to note that the proposed regulations under I.R.C.
§ 402(b) discuss the tax treatment to the participants as "compensation." Prop. Reg. §
1.402(b)-l(a)(1)(1971). See generally Simmons, supra note 60, at 538-43.
157. I.R.C. § 501 provides an automatic tax exemption for a trust qualified under
I.R.C. § 401(a). Subsection (a) of I.R.C. § 501 provides, in pertinent part: "An organiza-
tion described in . . . section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle
... " It must be noted that the applicable estate tax exemption, see I.R.C. § 2039(c),
also applies only to qualified plans, and would be unavailable to benefits from a disqual-
ified plan. If the plan is operated without a trust, because the assets of the plan are
invested with an insurance company, I.R.C. § 501(a) is applicable. See I.R.M. Audit
45(10) 5-2 § 713.2.
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when a plan becomes disqualified, the trust loses its exempt status and is
taxable under section 641. Unlike trusts intended to be taxable and,
consequently, drafted for maximum tax advantage, the plan which be-
comes disqualified, and the nonexempt trust associated with it, did not
anticipate federal income taxation, and thus are unable to avoid max-
imum tax liability.
A disqualified plan's trust must file a federal income tax return 158
because it is a separate taxable entity.1 59 In fact, the IRS Audit Manual
provides' 60 that even if an employer contests the IRS's decision to revoke
the qualified status of the plan, the examining IRS agent must prepare the
trust's tax returns. The income of such a trust is recognized to the extent
it is realized under the trust's regular method of accounting. Income
subject to such recognition includes all interest, dividends, and capital
asset transactions. 161 Unrealized appreciation or depreciation is not re-
cognized for tax purposes nor-and this is crucial-are employer contri-
butions recognized as income to the trust.162
After the gross income of a disqualified plan's taxable trust has been
determined, the distributable net income 63 of that trust must be cal-
culated. Although most taxable trusts receive credit for distributions to
participants when calculating the distributable net income, 64 a special
problem is created for the trust of a disqualified plan.
In accordance with Revenue Ruling 74-299, 161 section 661(a) allows a
disqualified plan a deduction for distributions to terminating participants
when computing its taxable income subject to the separate share rule of
section 663.166 The separate share rule, as applied to a trust of a disqual-
ified plan that has more than one beneficiary, means that each benefi-
ciary's share (account) is to be treated as a separate trust for the plan
trust's calculation of distributable net income. Revenue Ruling 74-299
specifically states that the provisions of section 402(b) take precedence
158. The present form is Form 1041. A return must be filed if the trust had taxable
income, gross income in excess of $600, or a beneficiary who is a nonresident alien. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(a), T.D. 7407, 1976-1 C.B. 353.
159. As a separate taxable entity, the trust of a disqualified plan has the same right to
appeal as do all other taxpayers. See note 89 supra.
160. See I.R.M.-Audit 45(10) 5-2 § 713.1.
161. See Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-2 (1956).
162. Cf. I.R.C. § 158 (contribution to qualified homeowners association exempt from
tax).
163. See I.R.C. § 643(a).
164. Id. § 661(a).
165. 1974-1 C.B. 154.
166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-I(a) (1956).
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over section 662(a). Thus, the deduction allowed a disqualified plan's
trust under section 661(a) is limited to the distributees' separate shares of
the distributable net income.
To illustrate these rules, assume that a qualified, defined contribution
plan becomes disqualified and accordingly the plan's trust loses its
exempt status. Assume also that the trust makes a $15,000 distribution to
one terminated participant in the taxable year, that the trust has $50,000
in taxable income, and that the terminated participant had $3,000 of the
taxable income allocated to his individual account in the year of distribu-
tion.167 Under section 661(a) the trust in this hypothetical is entitled to
only a $3,000 deduction (not the $15,000 distribution) when computing
its net taxable income.
In addition to the separate share rule of Revenue Ruling 74-299, the
trust of a disqualified plan is entitled to the same ordinary and necessary
deductions for business expenses that individuals are allowed. 168 These
may consist of interest expenses, legal expenses, actuarial fees, trustee
fees, administrative expenses, and depreciation. Finally, such a trust,
because it is a complex trust, 169 is entitled to an exemption of $100 per
year. 170
A second effect on the trust associated with a disqualified plan con-
cerns the proper treatment of withholding taxes.1 71 Section 3401(a)(12)
specifically exempts from wages contributions to, or distributions from,
qualified plans. Again, the Code and regulations are silent with respect to
trusts of disqualified plans. The regulations, 172 however, provide that
nonannuity distributions from pension or retirement pay are subject to
167. Revenue Ruling 74-299 and the regulations under I.R.C. § 641 squarely address the
income taxation of a trust of a disqualified defined benefit plan, since such plans generally
do not have separate participant shares or accounts.
168. See Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-I (1956).
169. Id. § 1.651(a)-1.
170. Id. § 1.642(b)-1. In addition, such trusts are entitled to the dividend exclusion. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.116-1, T.D. 7332, 1975-1 C.B. 204.
Because of the nature of the disqualification process, the final determination that a plan
has lost its qualified status will inevitably be made long after the plan year is closed. Once
the trust of a disqualified plan becomes subject to income taxation, it will owe interest on
any taxes not timely paid. Nevertheless, delinquency penalties will generally not be
assessed if the required informational returns of a qualified plan and trust were otherwise
timely filed.
171. See I.R.C. § 3401.
172. See Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(1)(i), T.D. 6259, 1957-2 C.B. 645. After determ-
ing the gross income and all applicable deductions, credits, and exemptions, the trust of a
disqualified plan is taxed according to I.R.C. § l(a).
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withholding taxes. The probable result will be that withholding tax
liability will parallel the income tax liability of the participants under
section 402(b); thus, if the participant in a disqualified plan recognizes
income under section 402(b), the trustee of the trust associated with a
disqualified plan may be subject to withholding tax liability to the extent
of the income so recognized. 173
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the numerous and drastic tax consequences associated with
the disqualification of a qualified pension plan, the best "defense" is a
constant and careful self-review to ensure its continued qualified status.
173. See Simmons, supra note 60, at 538-39. For a discussion of tax liability on
distributions from disqualified plans, see id. at 538-43.
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